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865 
NOTE 
 
Please Plead Me: Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Implications for 
Oklahoma Pleading 
I. Introduction 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,1 the Supreme Court first applied a 
plausibility pleading standard to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim in an antitrust case.   After Twombly required a plaintiff to plead more 
than just blanket allegations and legal conclusions, circuit courts struggled 
to ascertain whether the Twombly decision applied across the board, or 
whether the decision was specific to the complexities of antitrust litigation.2  
Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified its previous 
decisions regarding pleading requirements and held that under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8 all plaintiffs are required to plead “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”3   
As a result of the Iqbal amplification of the Twombly pleading standard, 
there now exist major discrepancies between the new federal standard of 
pleading and state standards of pleading, including Oklahoma’s continued 
liberal interpretation of its notice pleading statute.4  In addition, there is still 
at least one circuit which initially refused to extend the Iqbal decision, and 
at least one U.S. Senator seeking to nullify the decision through 
legislation.5 
The discrepancies between state and federal interpretation of virtually 
identical pleading statutes create a system where a complaint may now be 
                                                                                                                 
1.  See 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2. See Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice After 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 887-89 (2008) (noting how courts have 
differed in their application of the Twombly decision); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A 
“Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 
1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 838 (2008) (stating that the Twombly 
decision “creates uncertainty among lower courts and practitioners”).  
3.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
4.  See Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, & 7, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208. 
5. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that Iqbal may not 
apply because it is “special in its own way” but ultimately granting a motion to dismiss on 
other grounds); Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by 
Senator Arlen Specter in order “[t]o provide that Federal courts shall not dismiss complaints 
under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards 
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957)”). 
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found sufficient in an Oklahoma court, but insufficient in a federal court.  
Consider a citizen of Oklahoma who has been wrongfully convicted for 
rape.  The falsely accused plaintiff spends nineteen years in prison while 
attempting to obtain the DNA evidence that eventually exonerates him.6  
But his post-release claim against a police chief for denying him access to 
DNA evidence is thrown out by the Tenth Circuit because the factual 
contentions in his petition addressed general allegations, and the plaintiff’s 
alleged legal theory was not supported by any facts attributable to the police 
chief.7   
In response to petitions which include general allegations, the Tenth 
Circuit has stated that “the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff 
could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is 
insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this 
plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these 
claims.”8  Using the newly adopted Twombly standard, the facts that this 
wrongfully accused plaintiff alleged did not meet the plausibility threshold 
demanded at the pleading level.9  Would the claim survive in an Oklahoma 
state court using a more liberal standard? Should it survive? 
Requiring heightened pleading standards can waste judicial resources 
through a system of strict judicial inquiry of all petitions before the court.  
Yet it can preserve judicial resources by rescuing defendants from meritless 
claims.  Conversely, more liberal pleading requirements can provide 
plaintiffs an avenue for gaining access to the court for remedy of a wrong, 
and provide them with discovery tools to extract information from the 
defendant to evidence the wrong committed.  Yet, applying the more liberal 
pleading standard can also expose defendants to intrusive invasion of 
private documents, conversations, and interrogatories simply to allow a 
plaintiff to “drum up” the basis for a claim. The Iqbal decision addresses 
these difficulties and weighs them in favor of defendants, requiring what 
facially appears to be a more heightened standard of proof for plaintiff’s 
claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 
This note describes the possible implications of the Iqbal decision as it 
relates to state pleading standards, focusing specifically on whether it is in 
Oklahoma’s best interest to adjust its standards to conform to this 
precedent.  Part II discusses how statutory pleading requirements initially 
                                                                                                                 
6.  See Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2008). 
7.  See id. at 1287. 
8. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Ridge at Red 
Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
9.  See Bryson, 534 F.3d at 1286-87. 
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evolved from code pleading to notice pleading in both federal and 
Oklahoma courts.  Part III addresses significant Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, culminating with the Iqbal 
decision.  Part III then summarizes state supreme court responses to this 
recent shift in federal pleading standards.  Part IV analyzes the Iqbal 
decision and its implications for plaintiffs and defendants if applied in a 
similar manner in Oklahoma courts, concluding that while it is not 
necessary for Oklahoma to adopt Twombly’s plausibility standards, a more 
accurate application of the current pleading standard is needed.  A plaintiff 
must be required to plead more than elements of a cause of action in order 
to be given access to discovery resources.  Finally, Part V will briefly 
summarize the main points of the note and conclude. 
II. History of Pleading Requirements: The Evolution from Code Pleading to 
Notice Pleading 
A. The Development of Federal Pleading Standards and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
federal courts used the same system of pleading as the state where the 
federal court was located.10  Many states modeled their pleading system 
requirements after “The Field Code,” which was drafted by David Dudley 
Field and which served as the New York Code for pleading.11  Commonly 
termed “code pleading,” this system required a petition to contain “[a] 
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and 
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a 
person of common understanding to know what [was] intended . . . .”12  But 
a “statement of facts” was easier said than done, as the word “facts” was 
interpreted as “ultimate facts.”13  Evidentiary facts and conclusions of law, 
though informative, were not accepted.14  
                                                                                                                 
10. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: 
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1299 (1935). 
11.  See Josephson, supra note 2, at 874. 
12.  Charles E. Clark, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 211 n.2 (2d ed. 1947) 
(quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act ' 255, repealed by Act of April 4, 1962, ch. 308, ' 10001, 
1962 N.Y. Laws 1297, 1549). 
13.  See George B. Fraser, The Petition in Oklahoma, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1952). 
14.  See id. 
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The result created a system where “the plaintiff may not plead the facts 
as they happened, but must plead the conclusions that should be drawn 
from the actual acts or events.”15  For example: 
In one case which involved an action on an insurance policy, the 
plaintiff, relying on the statutory presumption of death, alleged 
that the insured had been absent and not heard from since August 
4, 1914. The court stated that this allegation was insufficient 
since the plaintiff’s right to recover depended on the ultimate 
fact that the insured was dead and that the plaintiff should have 
alleged that the insured was dead instead of facts that would 
establish his death. This result is questioned in view of the fact 
that proof of absence for the statutory period would support a 
verdict.16 
Because the plaintiff pleaded facts to show the insured was dead (a set of 
evidentiary facts) rather than pleading that the insured was dead (an 
ultimate fact) the claim was thrown out of court under the code pleading 
standard.17 
When the plaintiff was trapped in this unfortunate loophole, his case was 
dismissed for a failure to state a claim.  Though he would most likely be 
granted leave to amend his complaint and return to court, the plaintiff was 
still punished under the technicalities of code pleading.  The plaintiff would 
be sent to reword his petition to plead ultimate, rather than evidentiary 
facts, a technicality that could be the product of even the most carefully 
plead petition.  Ultimately, this produced a standard that was “easy to state 
but difficult to apply” as “[m]any concepts were a blend of fact and 
conclusion, and the Code’s rigid distinction led to inconsistent results 
concerning what level of detail needed to be pleaded, even for simple 
claims . . . .”18  Charles E. Clark, a chief drafter of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Second Circuit judge, commented that the distinction 
between facts and law or evidence was one of “generality and particularity 
in stating the transaction sued upon and . . . considerable flexibility should 
be accorded the pleader.”19  However, the code pleading system of parsing 
a petition down to ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law 
was all but flexible for the pleader. 
                                                                                                                 
15.  Id. at 425. 
16.  Id. 
17.  See id. 
18.  Josephson, supra note 2, at 875. 
19.  Clark & Moore, supra note 10, at 1301. 
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Because code pleading led to such inconsistent results and confusion, the 
Rules Enabling Act was passed, and in 1938, the Supreme Court 
promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of this new set of 
laws radically departed from code pleading requirements and instead 
required the plaintiff to only give the defendant “notice” of the plaintiff’s 
claim against him.20  This procedural reform had the effect of leaving 
much, but not all, of the factual detail to be uncovered as the litigation 
continued.  Specifically, the newly adopted rules stated that “a pleading that 
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”21  Plaintiff was no longer 
forced to examine his statements to determine whether his ultimate fact was 
actually an evidentiary fact.  This new standard required the plaintiff to 
include enough information in his petition so the defendant was aware of 
the nature of the suit, facilitating an answer without being boxed into the 
strict method of code pleading. 
B. The Development of Oklahoma’s Pleading Standards 
The Oklahoma Territorial Legislature first adopted code pleading in 
1893.22    Forty-five years after the Territory began to employ code 
pleading, the federal courts adopted notice pleading.  Despite the federal 
change, Oklahoma continued to use code pleading language in its courts for 
over forty more years.23  Oklahoma retained elements of code pleading in 
the pleading statute, requiring a plaintiff to include “[a] statement of the 
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, and 
without repetition”24 until the state adopted the federal notice pleading 
standard in 1984.25  In Oklahoma’s code pleading, the same three types of 
allegations existed as in federal code pleading: ultimate facts, evidentiary 
facts, and conclusions of law.26  
                                                                                                                 
20.  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (noting that “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain 
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests”) (footnote omitted); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ' 8.04 (3d ed. 2010). 
21.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
22.  George B. Fraser, Improving the Pleading Process in Oklahoma, 53 OKLA. B.J. 495, 
495 (1982). 
23.  See id. at 495; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1)(Supp. 1984) (current version at 
12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1)(Supp. 2010)). 
24.  12 OKLA. STAT. ' 264 (1981). 
25.  See Act of May 1, 1984, ch. 164, ' 8, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 583. 
26.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt. (West 2010). 
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As in the federal system, code pleading required plaintiffs to plead the 
ultimate facts of the claim creating similar difficulties for plaintiffs.27  In 
order to determine the ultimate facts of the claim, the court refused to 
consider evidentiary facts and conclusions of law as a basis for a claim for 
relief in the petition.28  In Oklahoma, code pleading created a system which 
“caused difficulty to attorneys and judges alike who . . . found themselves 
confused as to whether a particular allegation [was] one of fact, evidence, 
or law.”29  If a pleading was found to be “too detailed, it may violate the 
rule forbidding evidentiary facts and, if too broad, may be a conclusion of 
law, thereby failing to state a cause of action.”30  In short, while a code 
petition in Oklahoma would survive only if plaintiff’s facts showed he must 
recover, a federal complaint would survive if plaintiff’s facts merely 
showed that he may recover.31   If the “code petition contain[ed] allegations 
that [were] subject to several interpretations  . . . the petition [was] 
insufficient even though proof of the facts alleged would support a verdict 
for the plaintiff.”32  But in federal court, if any one of various inferences 
drawn would allow plaintiff to succeed, the complaint survived.33  
Determining a prima facie case and exactly how to articulate it to the 
defendant and to the court was a particularized process and puzzling to 
many who attempted it.  
After realizing the difficulties inherent in code pleading, Oklahoma did 
not treat petitions quite as harshly as many previous federal courts, 
generally allowing a petition if it was “informative;”34 meaning a cause of 
action would successfully state a claim if it could be “‘inferred with 
sufficient clarity to advise court or counsel of the basis of her complaint.’”35  
In Oklahoma, the petition needed to “show that the plaintiff ha[d] a claim or 
cause of action, but the claim d[id] not have to be alleged in a certain 
way. . . . Thus, Oklahoma . . . avoided many of the troubles that other courts 
                                                                                                                 
27.  See id. 
28.  See id. 
29. Jimmie J. Hamilton, Note, Pleading: Fact Pleading in Oklahoma C Time For a 
Change?, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700 (1977); see also Fraser, supra note 13, at 424 (citing 
Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COL. L. REV. 
416, 417 (1921)) (stating “[t]he results have been very arbitrary because there is no logical 
distinction between statements which are grouped by courts under phrases ‘statement of fact’ 
and ‘conclusions of law’”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30.  Hamilton, supra note 29, at 700. 
31.  See Fraser, supra note 13, at 431. 
32.  Id. 
33.  See id. 
34.  See id. at 426. 
35.  Id. (citing Branson v. Branson, 1942 OK 77, & 49, 123 P.2d 643, 651). 
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. . . experienced in distinguishing between evidentiary facts, ultimate facts 
and conclusions of law.”36  
Interestingly, on its face Oklahoma’s statute read as code pleading, but in 
practice, as Oklahoma courts attempted a more simple procedure, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted language from a Supreme Court case 
aimed at notice pleading in order to evaluate claims under motions to 
dismiss.37  As Oklahoma began to adopt other provisions set forth in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many in the legal field began to advocate 
for the statutory adoption of notice pleading, but the balance between 
viewing the notice standard as properly rejecting meritless claims or 
wasting judicial resources was a source of contention.38  In addition to 
being confusing, because a plaintiff could appeal a dismissal of his 
complaint, or simply file a new action, rejecting claims for code 
technicalities took “much of the court’s time as well as that of the 
parties.”39  Alternatively, by “assigning a lesser role to the pleadings as do 
the Federal Rules, much less time would be spent in amending pleadings.”40 
Scholars also looked to other states’ modification of code pleading for 
guidance and options for Oklahoma change.41  Concerns revolved around 
whether Oklahoma should keep language requiring plaintiffs to state a 
“cause of action” or change the language to require a “claim for relief,” and 
whether Oklahoma should adopt the new federal rules entirely to simplify 
practicing in both state and federal court.  George Fraser, former professor 
of law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, supposed that 
“[s]ince a plaintiff must show the existence of the elements of his claim 
whether he is required by statute to state a claim, a right to relief, or a cause 
                                                                                                                 
36.  Id. at 451-52. 
37.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 264 (1984), repealed by Act of May 1, 1984, ch. 164, ' 32, 
1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 628; Powell v. Seay, 1976 OK 22, & 12, 553 P.2d 161, 164. 
38.  Hamilton, supra note 29, at 702 (noting that “[w]hile few outright miscarriages of 
justice have resulted through dismissal of the action when, through inadvertence or lack of 
skill, the pleader failed to include sufficient facts in his petition, prolonged and useless delay 
has undoubtedly resulted from the testing of the sufficiency of the pleading and in 
amendments thereof when necessary and permitted”). 
39.  Id. at 701. 
40.  Id. 
41. See id. at 703-04 (looking at North Carolina’s altered requirements for a possible 
alternative to Oklahoma’s current standard); see also Fraser, supra note 22, at 497 
(considering how a Texas statute retained portions of code pleading in stating a “cause of 
action” when adopting a notice pleading statute); Recent Developments, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 
194, 204 n.9 (1981) (citing Illinois, New York, and Texas statutes for evidence of states who 
retained the phrase “cause of action” in pleading statutes adopted post-Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure) (footnote omitted). 
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of action, any one of these phrases may be used in the Oklahoma 
Statutes.”42  Moreover, while “[t]he adoption of all the federal rules would 
simplify the practice of law because attorneys would have to know only one 
set of rules of practice . . . . Retaining the phrase >cause of action’ would not 
require a long verbose petition . . . .”43 
Ultimately, Oklahoma adopted the language of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) verbatim.44  In explaining the movement to notice 
pleading, the Committee Comment to the new section relied on United 
States Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the new rule was 
formulated to give “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which is rests.’”45  Moreover, the Committee noted the new 
section “[did] not prohibit the pleading of facts or conclusions of law as 
long as the pleading [gave] fair notice of the nature of the claim asserted.”46  
The Committee further stated that the shift to notice pleading 
“acknowledge[d] that modern devices such as discovery, pretrial 
conferences, and summary judgments are more effective methods of 
performing the functions of disclosing the factual and legal issues in 
dispute,  pretrial planning, and disposing of frivolous or unfounded claims 
and defenses which historically were performed by the pleadings.”47 
The statutory adoption of notice pleading in Oklahoma was designed to 
be a mirror image of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and at the time of 
adoption it was applied in the same manner as in federal courts.  However, 
the recent federal shift in pleading procedure raises the specter of code 
pleading, leaving states like Oklahoma in a position to determine whether to 
continue the current liberal standard applied since the adoption of notice 
pleading or whether to conform to recent federal precedent. 
III. Development of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 
                                                                                                                 
42.  Fraser, supra note 22, at 497. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), with 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1) (Supp. 1984). 
45.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. 2008 committee cmt. (2010) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007)). 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly, federal courts applied 
the same interpretation of notice pleading for fifty years, following the 1957 
case Conley v. Gibson.48 
  
                                                                                                                 
48.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
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A. Conley v. Gibson and the Freedom to Plead as You Please 
In Conley, after a railroad eliminated forty-five jobs belonging to black 
workers, only to replace the majority of the positions with white workers, 
the discharged employees sued their collective bargaining agent for unfair 
representation based on discrimination.49  While the claim was initially 
dismissed at trial court on a jurisdictional issue, the respondent requested 
that the Supreme Court take the liberty to address the failure to state a claim 
issue, arguing that if the jurisdictional issue was overturned, the dismissal 
should be upheld for failure to state a claim.50  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the holdings of various circuit courts advising judges “that a complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
[that] would entitle him to relief.”51  The Conley Court found it sufficient 
that the petitioners had alleged they “were discharged wrongfully by the 
Railroad and that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect 
their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them with their 
grievances all because they were Negroes.”52  To the Court, the plaintiffs 
had sufficiently supplemented these allegations with sufficient detail of 
events underlying the claim.53 
If the allegations were proved true, the petitioners would have a claim, 
and this was adequate for survival of a motion to dismiss.54  The Court did 
not weigh the probability of the allegations.55  The Court acknowledged 
that discovery and pretrial procedures allowed plaintiffs and defendants an 
opportunity to parse away the claim and force their opponent to divulge 
exactly what facts evidenced the issues at stake in the claim or 
counterclaim.56  In addition, this standard of pleading protected plaintiffs by 
preventing litigation from becoming a “game of skill in which one misstep 
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome,” ultimately “facilitat[ing] a 
proper decision on the merits.”57  Conley rested on the proposition that “the 
truth will out” and arguably lifted the bar in the plaintiff’s favor by seeming 
to accommodate most any pleadings as sufficient to trigger subsequent 
                                                                                                                 
49.  See id. at 42-43. 
50.  Id. 45-46. 
51.  Id. (emphasis added). 
52.  Id. at 46. 
53.  See id. at 47. 
54.  See id. at 45-46. 
55.  See id. at 45-48. 
56.  See id. at 47-48. 
57.  Id. at 48. 
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litigation.  The language used in Conley was eventually adopted by at least 
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia in dismissing complaints for 
failure to state a claim for relief.58 
B. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Pleading Plausibly 
In 2007, the Supreme Court revisited pleading standards in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly.59  In Twombly, respondents represented a putative class 
suing Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) for violation under ' 1 
of the Sherman Act60 which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce . 
. . .”61  The respondents claimed that the ILECs generally engaged in 
parallel conduct by making agreements which resulted in higher prices, 
poorer networks, and impaired competition.62  Upon reviewing a motion to 
dismiss, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Conley and found 
the claim sufficient, stating that a court “would have to conclude that there 
is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than 
coincidence” in order to dismiss the claim.63   
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter refused to apply the Conley “no 
set of facts” standard in a 7-2 decision, claiming that the Conley standard 
was “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted 
pleading standard.”64  Instead, the Court required antitrust plaintiffs to 
plead enough factual matter to “nudge[] their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible,” lest their complaints be dismissed.65  This would 
involve “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action [would] not do.”66  Because the defendant’s 
parallel conduct could be evidence of happenstance lawful conduct, the 
Supreme Court held that the complaint needed factual allegations that 
would “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery [would] reveal 
evidence of illegal agreement.”67 
                                                                                                                 
58.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
59.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
60.  See id. at 550. 
61.  15 U.S.C. ' 1 (2000). 
62.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
63.  Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 554. 
64.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546. 
65.  See id. at 570. 
66.  Id. at 555. 
67.  See id. at 556. 
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The Court formulated this rejection and replacement of Conley in a 
complex antitrust suit that presented pleading issues very different from 
those raised by the ordinary plaintiff.  The majority relied on many issues 
specific to antitrust litigation, and signaled that the holding should be 
contextually contained.68  First, the Court stated that certiorari was granted 
to “address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through 
allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”69  Next, when analyzing the issue, the 
Court noted that the case “present[ed] the antecedent question of what a 
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under '1 of the Sherman Act” 
and further described what rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure required.70  It appeared that the Court was focusing its analysis 
on what constituted sufficient pleading specifically in an antitrust suit and 
not in federal pleadings in general. 
To the Court, the primary reason for treading cautiously when allowing a 
factually deficient claim to survive a motion to dismiss was the potentially 
burdensome expense of antitrust litigation.71  The Court observed that the 
threat of intrusive and expensive discovery could cause defendants to settle 
claims even when they were merely innocent victims of “anemic” cases.72  
The Court discounted any procedural safeguards, such as strict judicial 
oversight and limited initial discovery, as impractical in a realistic judicial 
world of loaded dockets and judges who are unfamiliar with details that 
may or may not be uncovered in discovery.73 
Despite the majority’s concerns, the dissent pointed out that while the 
majority quickly dispensed of Conley’s reasoning, at the time of the 
decision, twenty-six states (including Oklahoma) used Conley’s language 
when considering dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim.74  
Further, the dissent maintained that the majority’s discovery concerns 
called for “careful case management, including strict control of discovery, 
careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid 
                                                                                                                 
68.  See id. at 553-55. 
69.  Id. at 553. 
70.  See id. at 554-55. 
71. See id. at 558 (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust 
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust 
discovery can be expensive.”) (internal citations omitted). 
72.  See id. at 559. 
73. See id. at 559-60 (“We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what 
we cannot define; we cannot define ‘abusive’ discovery except in theory, because in practice 
we lack essential information.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1989)). 
74.  See id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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instructions to juries . . . [but did not] justify the dismissal of an adequately 
pleaded complaint without even requiring defendant to file answers denying 
a charge.”75  Finally, the dissent argued that the purpose of relaxed pleading 
was to keep plaintiffs in court,76 and if the Court wished to return to stricter 
standards, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended, not re-
interpreted.77 
The Twombly decision shook antitrust practice with the new plausibility 
standard, but because the Court did not specify whether its newly 
articulated pleading rules applied specifically to antitrust litigation or 
broadly to all federal civil suits, circuit courts were left struggling to 
determine whether to apply the seemingly stricter standards to their own 
pleadings.78 
C. Erickson v. Pardus: An Attempted Clarification Ultimately Results in 
Confusion 
Less than three weeks after the Twombly decision was rendered, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a Tenth Circuit decision affirming the District 
Court for the District of Colorado’s dismissal of a section 1983 complaint.79  
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and 
remanded the case.80  The complaint alleged that prison officials violated 
the Eighth Amendment when they wrongfully terminated a prisoner’s 
hepatitis C treatments which resulted in potential life-threatening 
consequences for the plaintiff.81  The Supreme Court granted review 
because the dismissal “depart[ed] in so stark a manner from the pleading 
standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”82  
The District Court dismissed the petition using Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language, finding that the prisoner failed to allege facts showing substantial 
harm that would not have ultimately resulted from his disease with or 
without treatment.83  The District Court interpreted Conley as requiring the 
plaintiff to allege the facts supporting each element of his claim in the 
                                                                                                                 
75.  Id. at 573. 
76.  See id. at 575. 
77.  See id. at 595. 
78.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
79.  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). 
80.  See id. at 94-95. 
81.  See id. at 89-90. 
82.  Id. at 90. 
83. See Erickson v. Pardus, No. 05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 650131, at * 4 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 13, 2006), aff’d, 198 Fed. App’x. 694 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 89 
(2007). 
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petition which the plaintiff failed to do.84  While it was possible to prove a 
set of facts in the future that would support his accusations, the court held 
that sufficient factual matter to support the allegations was absent from the 
petition.85  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal.86 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision.87  But, rather than citing the 
“plausibility” standard for pleadings advanced in Twombly, the Court 
reaffirmed another proposition from the Conley case; that in a petition, the 
plaintiff must only “give notice” to the defendant of the grounds on which 
his claim rests.88  The Court also reiterated that the factual allegations in the 
complaint must be accepted as true.89  This decision further troubled lower 
courts and legal scholars who were grappling with Twombly’s application to 
litigation beyond the antitrust realm.90  If Twombly set a new requirement of 
pleading factual “plausibility,” it seemed unusual, if not erroneous, that the 
new standard was not used in a per curiam decision reviewing a similar 
motion to dismiss. 
D. Circuit Confusion After Twombly and Erickson Creates the Need for 
Iqbal 
In the wake of Twombly, circuit courts across the country each addressed 
the Twombly decision while pleading for clarification from the Supreme 
Court as they muddled through the confusing opinion.91  Ultimately, each 
                                                                                                                 
84. See id. at *6. 
85. See id. at *9. 
86. See Erickson, 198 Fed. App’x at 701. 
87. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94-95. 
88. See id. at 93. 
89. See id. at 94. 
90. See Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (maintaining that Erickson “emphasized the continuation of the prior Rule 8(a) 
standard”); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (refusing to 
consider Erickson claiming it did not undermine Twombly’s pleading requirements); 
Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 512 F.3d 338, 341 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(claiming that Erickson was a clarification of Twombly); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, 
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009) (“To 
confuse matters even further . . . [the Court] upheld the sufficiency of a complaint in 
Erickson v. Pardus without even mentioning the plausibility standard.”); Douglas G. Smith, 
The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1085-86 (2009) (suggesting that although 
some believe Erickson limited Twombly, this argument is “fanciful” and Erickson “reiterated 
that the plausibility standard flowed directly from the text of Rule 8”); Josephson, supra note 
2, at 902-03 (noting that “Erickson was written to reassure the lower courts that Rule 8 had 
not been drastically revised”). 
91. See Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 15 (citing many courts who have “disagreed about the 
import of Twombly”); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering 
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adopted Twombly either as applicable only in certain contexts or as a 
universal standard applying to all claims.  
Initially, one set of circuits refused to give Twombly general application 
and confined the plausibility requirements to antitrust or other complex 
litigation.  Within this set of circuits, cases in the Sixth Circuit, Seventh 
Circuit, and Ninth Circuit applied the same factual requirements to all 
complex litigation, such as all antitrust suits, or all litigation with 
potentially expansive discovery.92  In other cases, circuits held that the 
amount of factual detail required depended specifically on the complexity 
of the case.  For example, a Seventh Circuit case noted “[a] complaint must 
always . . . allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face,’ and how many facts are enough will depend on the type of case.”93  
Similarly, the Second Circuit claimed, “we believe the Court is not 
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead 
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to 
amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such 
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”94 
In Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C.,95 the Tenth Circuit first officially 
adopted the Twombly “plausibility” pleading standard for all claims before 
the court, but additionally noted that the decision in the case would be the 
same under the new or old pleading standard.96  The Tenth Circuit later 
                                                                                                                 
the “mixed signals” of Twombly); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“The issues raised by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of 
controversy for years to come.”); Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.,  508 
F.3d 327, 337 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting “uncertainty concerning the scope” of Twombly); 
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (evaluating “conflicting signals” identified 
in Twombly). 
92.  See Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Courts in and out of 
the Sixth Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have 
indicated that its holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that 
considered in Twombly.”); Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 
971 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Twombly laid to rest the Conley standard but limited its 
holding to antitrust cases); Midwest, 512 F.3d at 341 n.1 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007)) (“Twombly itself suggests that its holding may be limited to 
cases likely to produce ‘sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming’ litigation.”); Tamayo 
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating “[t]he task of applying 
Bell Atlantic to the different types of cases that come before us continues” and applying the 
standard to cases with costly discovery). 
93.  Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
94.  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (first emphasis added). 
95.  493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007). 
96.  See id. at 1215 n.2. 
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used language from Twombly to evaluate a motion to dismiss in Pace v. 
Swerdlow,97 but still seemed to give the rule liberal application, allowing 
the claim to survive a motion to dismiss despite a vigorous dissent 
countering that sufficient facts had not been pleaded under the Twombly 
standard.98 
The Tenth Circuit admitted its confusion in Robbins v. Oklahoma,99 
when addressing an Eastern District of Oklahoma decision.  The district 
court denied a motion to dismiss in a suit against daycare workers and DHS 
employees over the death of an eightBmonthBold child killed by blunt force 
trauma.100  The Conley “no set of facts” standard was used to grant the 
motion to dismiss for the DHS employees.101  Upon review, the Tenth 
Circuit noted that the Twombly standard of pleading was “less than 
pellucid,” citing other circuits that also struggled to ascertain the exact 
meaning of the Supreme Court’s holding.102  Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit 
maintained that “the bedrock principle that a judge ruling on a motion to 
dismiss must accept all allegations as true” remained, and moreover, “the 
degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and 
therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depend[ed] on 
[the] context [of the case].”103  Although the interpretation of what the 
plausibility standard meant differed in all of the above circuits, each found 
the Twombly holding to be limited to antitrust or complex litigation. 
The remaining circuit courts applied Twombly universally, but disagreed 
as to whether Twombly was a new standard, or a continuation of the 
previous standard.104  While the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit applied a 
                                                                                                                 
  97.  519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008). 
  98.  See id. at 1073, 1076 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
  99.  519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008). 
100.  See id. at 1246. 
101.  See id. 
102.  Id. at 1247. 
103.  Id. at 1247-48; see also Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(citing the Twombly “plausibility” standard but noting that “[t]his is not to say that the 
factual allegations must themselves be plausible; after all, they are assumed to be true. It is 
just to say that relief must follow from the facts alleged”). 
104. See Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that the 
Conley standard “no longer governs in light of Twombly”); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 
298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that even after Erickson addressed a section 1983 claim, 
the Twombly requirements were not undermined in the section 1983 claim before the court); 
Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(maintaining Twombly was a “further articulation of the standard by which to evaluate the 
sufficiency of all claims brought pursuant to Rule 8(a)”);  In re Katrina Canal Breaches 
Litig. 495 F.3d 191, 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Twombly dispelled the Conley 
standard). 
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new plausibility standard to all motions to dismiss,105 the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that although Twombly applied to all cases, it 
“le[ft] the long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading intact,” meaning 
that the Supreme Court did not “intend[] to tighten pleading standards.”106  
In essence, the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit considered Twombly to be a 
new standard that applied to claims before the court, but the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that while Twombly applied universally, the former 
standard had not been changed.  Even after establishing that Twombly 
applied to all litigation, the Third Circuit acknowledged that “to impose a 
‘plausibility’ requirement outside the ' 1 context . . . leaves us with the 
question of what it might mean.”107  While the application differed, the 
Third Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and District of Columbia Circuit applied their 
interpretations of Twombly across the board to all claims and did not restrict 
the decision to only antitrust cases or complex litigation. 
Confusion among the circuit courts gave rise to a need for the Supreme 
Court to revisit and clarify the application of the pleading requirements set 
forth in Twombly. 
E. Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
In 2009, the Supreme Court finally addressed the uncertainty rendered by 
Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.108  In Iqbal, the respondent, a Pakistani man, 
was held on immigration charges and placed in a group of detainees labeled 
“of high interest” while being investigated shortly after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks.109  Iqbal’s complaint focused on his treatment while 
at the detention center Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit.110  
Iqbal brought a Bivens action, which is a “private cause of action under the 
Constitution . . . to recover damages against federal officers for violations 
of [Constitutional] rights.”111  Iqbal alleged that the petitioners, Robert 
Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and John 
                                                                                                                 
105.  See Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (interpreting 
Twombly as “establishing a plausibility standard for [all] motions to dismiss”); Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the Twombly standard 
was “intended to apply to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in general”). 
106.  Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
107.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. 
108.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
109.  See id. at 1943. 
110.  See id. at 1943-44. 
111.  Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *13 
(E.D. N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 409 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. (2009) 
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Ashcroft, then Attorney General of the United States, “designated [him] a 
person of high interest on account of his race,” and knew of and 
implemented policies which resulted in harsh treatment and abuse of Iqbal 
on account of his race.112 
The specific harsh treatment of which Iqbal complained included: (1) 
solitary confinement, (2) constant light within his jail cell, (3) air 
conditioning in his cell during winter, (4) heat in his cell during summer, 
(5) hours of exposure to rain followed by a return to an air-conditioned jail 
cell, (6) inadequate food resulting in a loss of 40 pounds, (7) name calling, 
(8) two separate beatings, (9) denial of medical care, (10) denial of 
communications with defense counsel, (11) denial of legal mail, (12) denial 
of participation in prayers and other religious services, (13) daily strip 
searches, and (14) at least four body cavity searches.113  More specifically, 
on one occasion, officers informed Iqbal he had a visitor, but instead took 
him to a room filled with fifteen officers who “threw him against the wall, 
kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him 
across the room.”114  On another occasion, officers performed three 
consecutive strip and body-cavity searches of Iqbal all in the same room.115  
The same officers then turned off a recording camera and beat Iqbal while 
escorting him back to his jail cell when he refused a fourth body cavity 
search.116  Before leaving Iqbal in his jail cell, one officer “urinated in the 
toilet in Iqbal’s cell and turned the water off so the toilet could not be 
flushed until the next morning.”117 
1. Circuit to Certiorari 
When Iqbal’s case was heard before the district court, the Supreme Court 
had not yet decided Twombly.118  The district court noted that the parties’ 
disagreement over how specific the petition must be “expose[d] a tension 
between the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules and one of 
the core purposes of qualified immunity C protecting public officials from 
the burdens of discovery against unmeritorious claims.”119  But the court 
ultimately determined that “the qualified immunity ‘standard [would] not 
allow the Attorney General to carry out his national security functions 
                                                                                                                 
112.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942, 1944. 
113.  See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149. 
114.  Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *4. 
115.  See id. at *5. 
116.  See id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
119.  Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *11. 
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wholly free from concern for his personal liability; he may on occasion 
have to pause [and] consider whether a proposed course of action can be 
squared with the Constitution . . . .’”120  Much of Iqbal’s asserted treatment, 
such as daily searches, was possibly consistent with either legitimate or 
illegitimate activity.121  However, the district court found that this judgment 
was not appropriate for a motion to dismiss, because the court was to 
“assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations and draw all inferences in 
their favor.”122  The district judge reasoned that “[p]laintiffs should not be 
penalized for failing to assert more facts where, as here, the extent of 
defendants’ involvement is peculiarly within their knowledge.’123 
By the time the decision was reviewed by the Second Circuit, the 
Supreme Court had modified antitrust pleading requirements in Twombly.  
The Second Circuit analyzed all conflicting signals in Twombly, 
determining that while there were many indicators for the decision to be 
applied narrowly to antitrust suits, there were also indicators that the 
decision was meant to apply more broadly.124  The Second Circuit chose to 
apply Twombly only in situations “where such amplification [was] needed 
to render the claim plausible,”125 and refused to universally impose a 
heightened pleading requirement as both Twombly and Erickson each 
denied the creation of a heightened standard in Twombly.126 
In holding that the petition stated enough grounds to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the Second Circuit recognized procedural tools useful in protecting 
government officials during the suit, such as the use of a motion for more 
definite statement, limited discovery with involved and approved judicial 
oversight, and the use of a motion for summary judgment if discovery did 
not produce evidence of personal liability.127  The court held that while 
Twombly could be interpreted as requiring additional facts to prove the 
defendant’s express approval of Iqbal’s treatment, “all of the Plaintiff’s 
allegations respecting the personal involvement of [defendants Hasty, 
                                                                                                                 
120.  Id. at *14 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985)). 
121.  See id. at *16. 
122. Id. at *16 (stating “the inquiry into what actions defendants took and the 
reasonableness of those actions in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is not one that 
can be made on a motion to dismiss,” and finding “[i]n these circumstances, the objective 
reasonableness of defendants’ actions is a question that, in my view, is properly addressed 
only on a motion for summary judgment”). 
123.  Id. at *21. 
124. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-57 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
125.  Id. at 157-58. 
126.  See id. at 158. 
127.  See id. at 158-59. 
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Ashcroft, and Mueller were] entirely plausible, without allegations of 
additional subsidiary facts.”128 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Cabranes noted that case precedent, 
including Twombly, was “less than crystal clear and fully deserve[d] 
reconsideration by the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity.”129  
Acting upon the confusion in the circuits courts as to Twombly’s 
appropriate application, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
these concerns in Iqbal. 
2. Twombly Confirmed as a Blanket Interpretation of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 
While to many circuit courts Iqbal was seen as an expansion of 
Twombly, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Iqbal that the Twombly 
decision was an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which 
provided the grounds for the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, but that 
by interpreting Rule 8, the decision “expounded the pleading standard for 
‘all civil actions.’”130 
In evaluating Iqbal’s complaint, the majority first wholly rejected the 
argument of supervisory liability under a Bivens claim and held that 
“[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title 
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”131  The 
Court then broke the complaint into three sections of analysis: legal 
conclusions, factual allegations, and plausible inferences.132  First, Iqbal 
alleged that the plaintiffs were principal architects and instrumental in the 
policy which singled him out for his “religion, race, and/or national origin” 
and subjected him to “harsh conditions of confinement.”133  The majority 
disregarded these statements as a “formulaic recitation of the elements”134 
and conclusory allegations, deeming the statements as “not entitled to be 
assumed true.”135  The Court maintained that it was “the conclusory nature 
of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, 
that disentitle[d] them to the presumption of truth.”136 
                                                                                                                 
128.  See id. at 166. 
129.  Id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
130.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
131.  Id. at 1949. 
132.  See id. at 1951-52. 
133.  Id. at 1951 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
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Next, the Court considered the factual allegations of the complaint.  
Specifically, the complaint first stated that the FBI “arrested and detained 
thousands of Arab Muslim men” which was approved by defendant 
Mueller.137  Second, the complaint stated that the policy of keeping such 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions was approved by both defendants 
Mueller and Ashcroft.138  The Court recognized these as factual allegations, 
and acknowledged that “[t]aken as true, these allegations are consistent 
with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high interest’ 
because of their race, religion or national origin.”139  Yet, although a 
legitimate claim could be recognized, the Court then stated that “given 
more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”140  
The Court recognized that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a legitimate 
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of 
their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental 
impact on Arab Muslims . . . .”141  Confusingly, the Court both claimed to 
take the factual allegations as true, but then drew an inference in favor of 
the defendant using Twombly’s plausibility standard. 
Finally, the Court analyzed the claim in light of inferences that could be 
drawn from the remaining factual allegations named, mainly that 
“respondent’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination.”  But 
to prevail using this inference, the Court required Iqbal to show “facts 
plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of 
classifying . . . detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, 
or national origin.”  Although only paragraphs before the Court recognized 
that the factual contentions could be consistent with this notion, the Court 
then chose to adopt what it considered the only plausible suggestion, that 
“the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a 
devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most 
secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist 
activity.”142 
The Court echoed its previous reasoning in Twombly, rejecting the 
argument that any discovery controls would be adequate protection for 
government officials exposed to discovery, as any discovery in the case 
would be time-consuming, counteracting the very purpose of qualified 
                                                                                                                 
137.  Id. 
138.  See id.  
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
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immunity C “to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including 
‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”143  
3. Dissent 
Justice Souter, who had written for the majority in Twombly, took issue 
with the Court’s subsequent application of the plausibility standard and 
rejected the majority’s opinion on two grounds: (1) the majority 
inappropriately rejected a claim of supervisory liability144 and (2) the 
majority misapplied the pleading standard set forth in Twombly.145  First, 
the dissent pointed out that defendants Mueller and Ashcroft admitted they 
could be found liable under a supervisory liability standard if actual 
knowledge of the discriminatory practices was shown in conjunction with 
indifference to that policy.146  Further, “the parties agreed as to a proper 
standard of supervisory liability, and the disputed question was whether 
Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).”147  The dissent highlighted that 
the complete rejection of supervisory liability by the majority was 
determined with no briefing, and addressed sua sponte by the Court, which 
“denie[d] Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.”148 
Because the dissent would recognize fault based on supervisory liability, 
the dissent found the complaint sufficient because “[i]f these factual 
allegations are true, [defendants] were, at the very least, aware of the 
discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately indifferent to 
it.”149  The dissent maintained that the majority misapplied Twombly, 
stating that “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true . . . . on 
the contrary . . . a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how 
skeptical the court may be.”150  More emphatically, the dissent claimed 
“[t]he sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently 
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the 
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”151  In sum, the 
                                                                                                                 
143. Id. at 1953 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
144. While the majority addressed the claim of supervisory liability, it is addressed in 
this article only to the extent that recognition of supervisory liability would affect the motion 
to dismiss before the Court. See id. at 1949, 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
145.  See id. at 1955. 
146.  See id. at 1956. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. at 1957. 
149.  Id. at 1959. 
150.  Id. (emphasis added). 
151.  Id. 
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dissent would not read allegations, factual or conclusory in isolation, but 
rather would read the complaint as a whole, deeming the complaint 
sufficient to give “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.’”152  Ironically, the Court had taken Justice Souter’s own 
words and applied them in a manner inconsistent with his intent in 
Twombly. 
While Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s dissent, he also wrote 
separately to emphasize the many procedural devices available to trial 
courts to protect government officials during the discovery process, 
determining that the Court had not presented “convincing grounds for 
finding these alternative case-management tools inadequate.”153 
F. State Pleading Standards Post Iqbal 
Across the nation, state supreme courts, other than Oklahoma’s, have 
varied in their interpretation and of Twombly and Iqbal.  To date, no less 
than eleven state supreme courts other than Oklahoma’s have addressed 
pleading since the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.  Of those eleven decisions, 
two have expressly adopted the Twombly decision.154  In Massachusetts, 
when plaintiffs sued the Ford Motor Company over a defect in a door 
handle, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted Twombly 
analysis and stated that “[b]ecause the term ‘defect’ is conclusory and can 
be subjective as well, a bare assertion that a defendant, while representing 
the opposite, has knowingly manufactured and sold a product that is 
‘defective,’ or suffers from ‘safety-related defects,’ does not suffice to state 
a viable claim.”155  Also adopting Twombly, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court rejected a Jewish plaintiff’s petition based on a requirement of a 
“showing” at the motion to dismiss level, rejecting the claim that his 
constitutional rights were violated when he was served non-kosher food 
while in prison.156 
Conversely, two state supreme courts have expressly rejected the 
Twombly decision.157  The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the 
dismissal of a bad faith suit and explicitly held that in Arizona, courts were 
                                                                                                                 
152.  See id. at 1961 (omission in original) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555 (2007)). 
153.  Id. at 1962 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
154. See Sisney v. Best Inc., 2008 SD 70, && 7-8, 754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09; Iannacchino 
v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008). 
155.  Iannacchino, 888 N.E.2d at 888. 
156.  See Sisney, && 1, 8, 754 N.W.2d at 806, 808-09.  
157. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz. 2008); Colby v. 
Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, & 5 n.1, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082. 
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to assume the truth of plaintiff’s facts and draw inferences from the facts 
alleged.158  The Arizona court held that “Arizona has not revised the 
language or interpretation of Rule 8 in light of Twombly.”159  Moreover, 
while legal conclusions “d[id] not invalidate a complaint . . . a complaint 
that state[d] only legal conclusions, without any supporting factual 
allegations, d[id] not satisfy . . . [the] notice pleading standard.”160  The 
Supreme Court of Vermont also rejected the Twombly plausibility standard 
in a wrongful termination suit referring to a complaint as “a bare bones 
statement that merely provides the defendant with notice of the claims 
against it.”161  The court stated, “we have relied on the Conley standard for 
over twenty years, and are in no way bound by federal jurisprudence in 
interpreting our state pleading rules . . . . [we] are unpersuaded by the 
dissent’s argument that we should now abandon it for a heightened 
standard.”162  These two state supreme courts kept the bar low for plaintiffs, 
allowing legal conclusions and factual allegations, so long as the defendant 
was put on notice of the claim against him. 
Four other state supreme courts have cited Twombly’s reasoning in 
interpreting their own statute, but have not wholly adopted the decision.163  
The Delaware Supreme Court retained its “any set of facts” language 
without discussing the Twombly opinion, but acknowledged it through 
citation in a footnote.164  In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court evaluated a 
civil perjury claim and used an “any set of facts” standard to evaluate the 
complaint.165  In its analysis, the court recognized the Twombly decision 
and found it applicable to the case at hand because like the suit in Twombly, 
“civil perjury claims may lead to abuse if more specificity in pleading is not 
required.”166  Likewise, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a motion 
to dismiss by looking only to the facts, accepted as true, drawing reasonable 
inferences for the plaintiff, and indicating that Twombly supported the 
proposition that a court is not bound by legal conclusions in its 
                                                                                                                 
158.  See Cullen, 189 P.3d at 346. 
159.  Id. at 347. 
160.  Id. at 346. 
161.  Colby, 2008 VT 20, & 13. 
162.  Id. & 5 n.1. 
163. See Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182 (Del. 2009); Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 
18, & 11, 939 A.2d 676, 680; Herbert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 
2008). 
164.  See Reid, 970 A.2d at 182 n.23. 
165.  See Bean, & 7, 939 A.2d at 679. 
166.  Id. & 11, 939 A.2d at 680. 
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determination.167  In Georgia, a dissenting opinion cited Twombly for the 
proposition that a plaintiff must include “more than a formulaic recitation 
of the elements . . . ,” although the case was not used in the majority 
opinion’s analysis.168 
Two state supreme courts have addressed pleading requirements, but 
have used some form of the “no set of facts” language from Conley to 
support their analysis, either expressly refusing to address the Twombly and 
Iqbal decisions, or not addressing the decisions because they were not 
raised in arguments.169  The Supreme Court of Indiana recently noted that 
“dismissal is improper unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the 
complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief,” but 
maintained that the plaintiff was still required to “plead the operative facts 
necessary to set forth an actionable claim.”170  The court recognized the 
recent Twombly decision, but did not expressly address the decision 
because the parties in the case did not make it an issue.171  Most recently, 
the Supreme Court of Montana used its standard “no set of facts” language 
to construe a complaint, maintaining that Montana precedent “reflect[ed] 
the principle that liberal rules of pleading allow for compliance with the 
spirit and intent of the law rather than a rigid adherence [for] formula or 
specific words.”172 In the Montana case, a plaintiff whose legs were 
tragically amputated after a workplace accident claimed the dismissal 
prevented him from “develop[ing] the record through discovery sufficiently 
to establish the facts necessary to prove his claims.”173  In response, the 
court recognized that “further discovery may constitute an appropriate 
remedy for lack of specificity in a complaint.”174 
Finally, and somewhat uniquely, the Supreme Court of Tennessee did 
not address Twombly or Iqbal in a recent decision, but relied on its previous 
standard of review for motions to dismiss, which does not mirror the 
Conley “no set of facts” language.175  The court looked to the facts alleged 
                                                                                                                 
167. See Herbert, 744 N.W.2d at 229, 235. 
168. See Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. Inc. v. State Election Bd., 654 S.E.2d 127, 132 
(Ga. 2007) (Sears, J., dissenting) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 
(2007)). 
169. See State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.1 (Ind. 2009); 
McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp.,  2010 MT 24, && 12, 17, 355 Mont. 120, 225 P.3d 
1221. 
170. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d at 296. 
171. See id. at 296 n.1. 
172. McKinnon, & 17. 
173. See id. && 5, 17. 
174. Id. 
175. See Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. 2009). 
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on the face of the complaint, but acknowledged that even if the facts were 
true they would not necessarily show a cause of action.176  The court 
maintained that a motion to dismiss would not be sustained unless “there 
are no facts warranting relief.”177  The court did not reference Conley, or 
reference a set of material to be proved in the future, but additionally did 
not refer to a plausibility standard or other language from Twombly or 
Iqbal.178 
Currently, Oklahoma’s statutory pleading requirement for stating a claim 
for relief is nearly identical in language to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2), with both requiring the plaintiff to provide “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”179  
However, even after the Twombly decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
has continued to cite Conley and evaluate claims with liberal treatment of 
factual statements, legal conclusions, and inferences drawn from the 
claim.180  The court routinely cites its standard of review for motions to 
dismiss stating: 
[m]otions to dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor.  The 
purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law that governs the 
claim in litigation, not the underlying facts.  A motion to dismiss 
. . . will not be sustained unless it should appear without doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
for relief.  When considering a defendant’s quest for dismissal, 
the court must take as true all of the challenged pleading’s 
allegations together with all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn from them. . . .  If relief is possible under any set of facts 
which can be established and is consistent with the allegations, a 
motion to dismiss should be denied.  A petition can generally be 
dismissed only for lack of any cognizable legal theory to support 
the claim or for insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 
theory.181 
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that “[i]f [defendant] 
desires to elicit additional facts or wishes to challenge the claim for lack of 
sufficient facts to support it, it should resort to discovery or seek summary 
                                                                                                                 
176. See id.  
177. Id. 
178. See id.  
179. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), with 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(a)(1) (2001). 
180. See Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, & 7 n.13, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208 n.13. 
181.  Id. & 7, 176 P.3d at 1208-09 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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judgment.”182  Most recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court used these 
same standards to evaluate a claim under a motion to dismiss even after the 
Supreme Court clarified its opinion on the matter in Iqbal.183 
Oklahoma will almost certainly adopt the Twombly decision for antitrust 
litigation, as the state has chosen to apply federal antitrust case precedent 
for purposes of the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act.184  Apart from this 
legislation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma will have discretion as to 
whether it is best to maintain the pleading practice in force for decades or 
adopt a new plausibility standard to be in uniformity with federal precedent 
in all civil cases.  Thus far, the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not appear 
persuaded by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Iqbal to alter its general 
civil pleading standards. 
IV. Analysis: To Plead But Not to Prove: Proposed Reform for Oklahoma 
While Oklahoma should not wholly adopt the reasoning of Twombly and 
Iqbal, it should protect defendants from meritless claims through a more 
stringent application of current standards.  The most controversial phrase on 
which Oklahoma courts rely is derived from Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language.  Oklahoma courts frequently state that “[a] motion to dismiss . . . 
will not be sustained unless it should appear without doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim for relief.”185  In order to 
determine the composition of the Oklahoma standard, and how it should be 
more accurately applied, this phrase should be closely examined.  First, a 
“claim” is more than a legal theory, and Oklahoma’s statute should require 
at least minimal factual allegations, with or without an accompanying legal 
theory, in order to show plaintiff’s right to relief.  Second, when 
considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s factual 
assertions should be taken as true, giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the 
doubt, and not unfairly holding him to a plausibility standard.  
A. Stating a Claim Still Requires Enough Facts to Put the Defendant on 
Notice 
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
incorporation of these rules into Oklahoma Pleading Code, Oklahoma 
adopted “notice pleading.”186  Twombly accurately stated that in notice 
                                                                                                                 
182.  Id. & 7 n.17, 176 P.3d at 1209 n.17 (emphasis omitted). 
183.  See Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24. 
184.  See 79 OKLA. STAT. ' 212. 
185.  See Darrow, & 7, 176 P.3d at 1208. 
186. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt. (2010) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 
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pleading “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to 
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair 
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim 
rests.”187  So, while the petition cannot merely engage in a “formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”188 the plaintiff is not barred 
from including the elements of a cause of action C he must merely support 
those elements with enough factual allegations to put the defendant on 
notice.  Importantly, Oklahoma’s Committee Comment to the newly-
adopted notice pleading statute stated that by “omitting any reference to 
facts” the new standard mirrored the federal standard and helped avoid the 
confusion previously experienced under code pleading.189  The Committee 
Comment did not eliminate factual pleading, but rather eliminated 
references to factual pleading, so that pleaders are not bogged down in 
differentiating ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law.190 
Twombly also properly identified a problem with Conley’s current 
application in many courts.  The Court noted that Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language “[could] be read in isolation as saying that any statement 
revealing the theory of the claim w[ould] suffice unless its factual 
impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings.”191  In other 
words, under this misinterpretation, the plaintiff may state his claim by 
stating his legal theory (i.e., elements of his cause of action), relying on 
Conley to add all factual details later in the litigation.  Using this reading of 
Conley, the Twombly court feared an abundant abuse of discovery tools and 
court resources, and relied on these dangers as the primary reasons for 
requiring more strict factual pleading.192  Twombly cited a Memorandum 
which reported that “discovery account[ed] for as much as 90 percent of 
litigation costs.”193  Similarly, the expense of discovery in antitrust cases 
and qualified immunity cases is also present for defendants in many other 
civil suits in federal court and in Oklahoma. 
                                                                                                                 
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (stating that the new function of the pleadings is to “giv[e] ‘fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’”). 
187.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). 
188.  Id. at 555. 
189.  12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt. 
190.  See generally id. 
191.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). 
192.  See id. at 558-60. 
193. Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (May 11, 1999), (192 F.R.D. 340, 357 (2000) [hereinafter Memorandum]). 
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A court’s resources are wasted when valuable time is stolen with endless 
motions, requiring defendants to produce documents they do not feel the 
plaintiff is entitled to without sufficient basic factual matter to apprise the 
defendant of who is suing him for what in the first place.  For these reasons, 
the Twombly Court emphasized that a meritless claim should be identified 
at the first available opportunity to save time and resources.194  However, 
the Twombly Court did not utilize another important figure from the same 
Memorandum, that “in almost 40% of federal cases, discovery is not used at 
all, and in an additional substantial percentage of cases, only about three 
hours of discovery occurs.”195  While Twombly and Iqbal reasoning is 
easily applied to cases where a defendant is in danger of shelling out 90% 
of his funds toward discovery, for many defendants, the cost of discovery is 
minor or non-existent, unless these defendants are settling for the purpose 
of avoiding expansive discovery. 
On top of potential subjection to intrusive discovery, when a defendant is 
only presented with a recitation of the elements of a statute, the defendant 
does not have adequate information to respond to allegations, and he must 
include a plethora of possibly meaningless defenses, lest they be waived.196  
To aid the pleader in determining how many facts to allege, Oklahoma and 
federal forms give assistance by demonstrating a typical negligence 
claim.197  In Oklahoma, the form petition alleges: (1) a date and place of the 
incident, (2) an allegation that defendant was driving negligently, (3) a 
detailed account of plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) a demand of judgment.198 
If Conley was applied in Oklahoma in an incorrect manner, then unlike 
the above petition, in a suit for negligence, the plaintiff’s mere legal 
conclusion that the defendant was negligent would suffice to survive a 
motion to dismiss creating much difficulty for the defendant.  For example, 
suppose a driver has been involved in more than one auto accident, each 
time rear-ending the car in front of him.  The driver has been served in a 
claim which states that he negligently drove his vehicle, causing neck injury 
to the plaintiff.  Based on the face of the petition, the defendant may not 
have any idea which of the many drivers is suing him without engaging in 
his own “fact-finding,” having been supplied with only the plaintiff’s name 
                                                                                                                 
194.  Id. at 558. 
195.  See Memorandum, supra note 193, at 357. 
196. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B)(ii) (stating that a defense is waived if not included in 
the responsive pleading); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012(B) (2001) (requiring that “[e]very 
defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required”). 
197.  See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8. 
198.  See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8. 
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and a blanket allegation of the defendant’s negligence.  Under a 
misinterpretation of Conley’s “no set of facts,” the plaintiff’s claim survives 
a motion to dismiss and he is permitted to flesh out all details to support his 
legal conclusion later in the suit, instead of at a minimum apprising the 
defendant of the date and place of the accident as suggested by Oklahoma 
and federal forms.  And while “statute of limitations” may be a defense for 
a wreck which occurred five years ago, it would not be appropriate for an 
accident which occurred only months before.  Nevertheless, the defendant 
would be forced to respond with every defense, whether applicable or not, 
because of this lack of information. 
The result could resemble “boilerplate pleading,” where the plaintiff 
merely recites a statute, planning on engaging in later discovery to drum up 
a factual claim, and where the defendant is forced to plead every defense in 
existence because he does not know why he is being sued.  The product of 
this “boilerplate pleading” would ultimately be a waste of judicial time and 
resources, yielding a petition and responsive pleading that were mere 
formalities, not serving any informative purpose whatsoever.  Under a 
proper interpretation of Conley, plaintiff should be required, in accordance 
with Oklahoma forms, to plead at the minimum the date and the place of 
the incident.  This information properly puts the defendant on notice of the 
accident for which he is being sued, without additional fact-finding by the 
defendant before his answer is due. 
Requiring the plaintiff to include factual allegations in his petition is still 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley.  In Conley, the 
respondents were sued under the Railway Labor Act under which the Court 
required exclusive bargaining agents to “represent all employees in the 
bargaining unit fairly and without discrimination because of race.”199  In the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs did not merely allege that they were 
employees in the bargaining unit who were discriminated against because 
of their race.200  This allegation would have been a formulaic recitation of 
the elements. Rather, the complaint alleged the railroads at which plaintiffs 
were employed; identified the bargaining agents responsible; alleged that a 
contract existed protecting the plaintiffs from discharge; included facts of 
the plaintiff’s discharge including dates of the discharge and numbers of 
black employees discharged and white employees hired; and finally 
contained further allegations that grievances from the discharged black 
                                                                                                                 
199.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
200.  See id. at 42-43. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/11
2011] NOTE 895 
 
 
employees were made to, and ignored by, the bargaining agents.201  This 
gave the Court adequate ground for holding that the plaintiffs had stated a 
claim for relief, and therefore the “no set of facts” language used by the 
Court referred to future factual matter needed to prove the many factual 
allegations already laid out in the complaint.202  
In Oklahoma, the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim is to determine, under the facts plaintiff has alleged, if there is a legal 
theory on which the plaintiff may prevail if any set of facts later proves 
plaintiff’s factual allegations in the petition.203  Like Conley, the reference 
to fact-finding in the future does not eliminate the need for factual detail in 
the petition, as factual allegations should be an indispensable part of the 
“claim.”  Rather, they are two separate standards.  The plaintiff must first 
use enough factual detail to put the defendant on notice.  In Oklahoma, this 
means using factual allegations, possibly together with legal conclusions 
from which a right to relief may be inferred.  The plaintiff must later meet a 
higher standard in his case by showing evidence (a set of facts) to prove the 
factual allegations contained in the petition in order to prevail on his claim.  
This heightened level of proof may come to play at a motion for summary 
judgment, or at trial, but it should not be required at the pleading stage. 
The requirement of some level of factual detail in the petition is 
supported by the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s standard that “[a] petition can 
generally be dismissed only for lack of any cognizable legal theory to 
support the claim or for insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 
theory.”204  This standard is two-fold.  A claim may be dismissed (1) with 
abundant factual detail, but for which no legal theory exists to support a 
claim; or (2) with too little factual detail, even if a legal theory in support of 
those facts exists.205  In either case the language seems to acknowledge that 
at least some factual detail is mandatory under Oklahoma’s current 
standard; otherwise, the court would not dismiss a petition for “too little 
factual detail.”  The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals explains that 
“[p]articular pleading requirements include ‘only the degree of specificity 
necessary to enable the opposing party to prepare his responsive pleadings 
and defenses.’  Such specifications include time and place, but not evidence 
or ‘detailed evidentiary matters.’”206 
                                                                                                                 
201.  See id.  
202.  See id. at 45-46. 
203.  See Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24.  
204.  Id. (second emphasis added). 
205.  See id.  
206. McFeely v. Tredway, 1990 OK CIV APP 71, & 13, 816 P.2d 575, 578 (citations 
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In the model petition, the date and place of the incident (facts), combined 
with negligence (legal theory of relief), are sufficient to put the defendant 
on notice for why he is being sued.  In practice, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court has held that when a plaintiff “asserted the existence of a contract, the 
breach thereof, and facts from which it might be determined that the breach 
was in bad faith” she had sufficiently met requirements of notice 
pleading.207  The plaintiff had sufficient factual allegations and a supporting 
legal theory for relief (bad faith).208 
If a plaintiff merely alleged “defendant was driving negligently and 
caused plaintiff injury” or “defendant breached a contract in bad faith” then 
the plaintiff would have only pleaded legal conclusions (recitation of the 
elements), without any factual allegations, and the petition would not be 
sufficient to give the defendant notice as to why he is being sued.  
Additionally, if the plaintiff had not pleaded his legal theory supporting 
relief, he would need to show additional facts from which a legal theory for 
relief could be identified, such as the fact that the defendant ran a red light, 
allowing the court to draw a reasonable inference of negligence. 
By examining what a “claim” consists of and determining that one 
important element of a claim in Oklahoma is factual support sufficient to 
put the defendant on notice, the use of Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
can be adequately reconciled with the Twombly holding that deems a 
“formulaic recitation of the elements” as insufficient for notice pleading.  
Because the Conley standard would still require some level of factual detail 
in order to put the defendant on notice, it should continue to be used in 
Oklahoma when evaluating a motion to dismiss. 
B. Give a Plaintiff the Benefit of the Doubt, and Do Not Apply a 
“Plausibility” Standard 
Both federal courts and Oklahoma courts require a court reviewing a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim to take all of a plaintiff’s 
factual allegations as true for the purpose of hearing that motion.209  A court 
is required to accept all allegations in the plaintiff’s petition as true, not 
merely those that are “probably true.”210  As the dissent in Iqbal points out, 
                                                                                                                 
omitted). 
207.  See Gens v. Casady Sch., 2008 OK 5, & 12, 177 P.3d 565, 570. 
208.  See id.  
209. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on 
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” 
(internal citations omitted)); Kirby, & 5, 222 P.3d at 24. 
210.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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this should mean that unless a plaintiff is making allegations “sufficiently 
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the 
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel” then the court 
does not have discretion of whether or not to believe the plaintiff.211  
Additionally, in Oklahoma, the court must draw all inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff as true.212  This is a logical standard, because a plaintiff is not 
required to prove his case at a motion to dismiss, and an ultimate fact may 
be inferred from a set of “evidentiary facts.”  A plaintiff is given the benefit 
of the doubt, and if any set of facts could later be shown which would 
entitle him to his claim for relief, then his petition should survive a motion 
to dismiss.  Thus, in a petition in which the alleged conduct could be lawful 
or unlawful, the inference of illegal conduct should be drawn in favor of the 
plaintiff, as the plaintiff could prove a set of facts later in support of illegal 
conduct. 
However, this standard is directly at odds with Twombly’s imposition 
that the plaintiff’s claim be plausible.  Under Twombly, if allegations in the 
complaint are consistent with evidence of both legal and illegal behavior, 
then the plaintiff’s claim will not survive a motion to dismiss.213  Twombly 
specifically requires that a complaint “allow[] the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” 
creating a requirement that “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.”214  But even Twombly confounds this 
standard by then clarifying that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed 
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is 
improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”215  Iqbal 
then suggests that a court refuse to consider any legal conclusions, and then, 
evaluating what remains in the petition, determine whether the claim is 
plausible.216  
                                                                                                                 
211.  Id. 
212.  See Kirby, & 5, 222 P.3d at 24. 
213.  A claim consistent with legal and illegal behavior was at issue in both Twombly and 
Iqbal.  In Twombly, an allegation of parallel behavior could have been proved illegal, but 
could also have been the product of legal happenstance. See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).  In Iqbal, while the plaintiff made specific allegations of heinous 
treatment based on his race, the Court identified that the treatment could have also been (and 
was more likely) a product of a legitimate government policy enacted after the September 
11, 2001 attacks. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
214.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 556). 
215.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
216.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. 
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But notice pleading, as evidenced by federal and Oklahoma forms which 
were created specifically to guide practitioners in pleading their petitions, 
does not require rejection of legal conclusions.217  After pleading the 
statement of jurisdiction (in federal court only), the plaintiff is only advised 
to plead one sentence about the defendant’s specific conduct: that “[o]n 
date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the 
plaintiff.”218  This means the petition’s reference to the defendant’s conduct 
would contain one factual statement: that on a certain date and time the 
defendant was driving.219  The second statement shows the plaintiff’s right 
to relief, or a legal conclusion: that the defendant was driving 
negligently.220  Under Conley, the plaintiff has sufficiently put the 
defendant on notice, but must later prove his allegations through a set of 
facts to show: that the defendant was driving at that time and place, that he 
was driving negligently, and the plaintiff sustained injury.  
Yet under Twombly and Iqbal a court could consider the legal conclusion 
(negligent driving) as not entitled to an inference of misconduct because it 
is a general allegation, unsupported by any meaningful facts.221  The 
plaintiff has not alleged that by “running a red light the defendant was 
driving negligently” or that “by crossing the median defendant was driving 
negligently.”  Rather, the plaintiff has made a limited set of factual 
statements together with a legal conclusion that could be proved later by a 
set of facts to be uncovered in discovery, such as the production of the 
police report or the depositions of witnesses to the accident.  Because the 
Iqbal court would not entertain the truth of a general allegation of 
negligence, the plaintiff would have failed to state a claim while using the 
federal forms.  The plaintiff’s remaining factual allegation, then put to a 
“plausibility” test, would not show that the defendant acted unlawfully.  
The federal form is clearly more aligned with a proper interpretation of 
Conley than the plausibility standard and rejection of legal conclusions in 
Iqbal.  If Oklahoma adopts Twombly’s approach to legal conclusions, it 
should first examine the Oklahoma forms, as the same situation would also 
likely occur in Oklahoma courts. 
                                                                                                                 
217.  See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11; 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8 (2001). 
218.  See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11. 
219.  See id.  
220.  See id.  
221.  See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), to support the proposition that courts are not under an obligation 
to accept a legal conclusion as true); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (stating 
“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). 
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Using similar analysis, the Supreme Court of Vermont recently held that 
when using the Vermont forms222 “the term ‘negligently’ [was] a legal 
conclusion” under notice pleading, and “the complaint include[d] no further 
factual allegations regarding the specific actions by the defendant that the 
plaintiff allege[d] amounted to negligence.”223  The Supreme Court of 
Vermont affirmed this standard, refusing to adopt Twombly noting that the 
current standard “strike[s] a fair balance, at the early stages of litigation, 
between encouraging valid, but as yet underdeveloped, causes of action and 
discouraging baseless or legally insufficient ones.”224  The purpose of a 
petition in Vermont, as in Oklahoma, is to “initiate the cause of action, not 
prove the merits of the plaintiff’s case.”225  If the plaintiff’s factual 
allegations are not impossible, he should be entitled to proceed past a 
motion to dismiss. 
The application of a plausibility standard and the rejection of legal 
conclusions is in direct contrast to a policy of taking the plaintiff’s factual 
allegations as true.  Because the federal and Oklahoma forms only require a 
minimum amount of factual detail in a complaint, a set of facts alone will 
rarely show a plausible claim without an accompanying legal conclusion.  If 
the plausibility standard was aligned with the notion of giving the plaintiff 
the benefit of the doubt, then Iqbal’s complaint that he was identified, 
arrested, and detained because of his race/national origin would have been a 
sufficient, believable inference drawn from his factual allegations of 
treatment, rather than an inference that was deemed not as likely as other 
possibilities. 
Maintaining Oklahoma’s standard of “tak[ing] as true all of the 
challenged pleading’s allegations together with all reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from them”226 continues to be the most consistent 
standard with federal and state forms on how to plead.  If the limited 
amount of factual detail in the petition, such as time and place of the 
incident, is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the reason he is 
being sued, and this is supported by a legal theory which could possibly 
                                                                                                                 
222. See Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9 (2000).  This Vermont form is nearly 
identical to the corresponding Oklahoma and federal form.  See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 
11; 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8 (2001); Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9.  The form 
consists of: (1) On date and place defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
plaintiff; (2) a statement of plaintiff’s resulting injuries; and (3) and demand of judgment. 
See Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9. 
223.  Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, & 12, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082. 
224.  Id. & 13. 
225.  Id. (emphasis added). 
226.  Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24. 
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entitle the plaintiff to relief, then the claim should survive a motion to 
dismiss.  Keeping this standard will ensure that while a plaintiff must plead 
factual allegations, he need not offer any level of proof of plausibility for 
these allegations at a motion to dismiss and will be provided an opportunity 
to engage in discovery to bolster his claim.  Granting the motion to dismiss 
on a plausibility basis means that a plaintiff has received a judgment on his 
case before the defendant is even required to deny the allegations in an 
answer.227 
In light of a proper interpretation of Conley, what should happen to the 
plaintiff, wrongfully convicted of rape, who has been thrown out of the 
Tenth Circuit for making general allegations?  It seems that under either a 
strict or a liberal pleading standard the Tenth Circuit properly dismissed the 
wrongfully convicted plaintiff’s claims against the police chief in Bryson v. 
Gonzales.228  The court searched the claim for any factual allegations that 
would indicate the police chief’s involvement.229  First, the plaintiff’s 
petition recognized that the police chief was not in office during the alleged 
time evidence was withheld from the plaintiff; and after the police chief 
was in office, there is no allegation that he was asked for evidence and 
unconstitutionally refused it to the plaintiff.230  Second, the plaintiff did not 
allege any personal participation the police chief had with a police chemist, 
a second defendant in the case.231  Finally, as to the remaining defendant, 
the district attorney, the court acknowledged that the police chief had no 
supervisory control or power over the district attorney, and so any wrongful 
actions could not attributed to the police chief.232  While the court noted 
that the plaintiff “may have many valid claims against many people,” 
without any wrongful facts attributable to the police chief a claim against 
him could not stand.233 
In sum, in order to “state his claim” a plaintiff must at a minimum 
include some facts that apprise a defendant of the nature of the suit against 
him.  This must be more than recitation of a legal theory.  If a plaintiff does 
not include a legal theory in his complaint, more than the minimal facts 
suggested by pleading forms may be needed in order for the court to 
                                                                                                                 
227. Typically, a plaintiff is granted leave to amend his petition.  If granted leave to 
amend, then this judgment would not be “final;” however, the plaintiff would still be 
punished despite following federal or state forms when pleading his case. 
228.  See 534 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008). 
229.  Id. at 1288-90. 
230.  Id. at 1288. 
231.  Id. at 1289. 
232.  Id. 
233.  Id. at 1290. 
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determine if a legal theory exists entitling the plaintiff to relief.234  Once the 
plaintiff has met this standard, he has succeeded in giving the defendant 
notice, even if his claim could just as possibly be evidence of legal conduct, 
so long as the plaintiff could also show evidence of illegal conduct.  A 
plaintiff’s claim should not be judged by the court to determine plausibility 
of his claim.  
It is important to remember that the defendant may quickly raise a 
motion for summary judgment if he believes that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact before the court, meaning that even after discovery (or 
limited discovery) the plaintiff does not have any set of facts available to 
him to prove his claim.  While the defendant in a negligence claim may 
have been driving in a reasonable manner, on a motion to dismiss the court 
should still “assume the truth of plaintiffs’ allegation[] and draw all 
inferences in [his] favor”235 and save “the inquiry into what actions 
defendants took and the reasonableness of those actions”236 for a motion for 
summary judgment.  A possible claim is a claim worthy of discovery.  
Whether the allegations are believable, plausible, or probable are all 
determinations to be made by the court at a later date. 
V. Conclusion 
In order to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every  action”237 before a court, each court must balance both a plaintiff’s 
and a defendant’s right to relief, for what is “just” remains in the eye of the 
beholder.  Defendants would prefer the dismissal of every petition before 
the court (an arguably inexpensive and speedy determination), and plaintiffs 
would prefer the most bare allegations to suffice.  A middle ground 
exists which requires a plaintiff to put forward enough facts to put a 
defendant on notice of why he is being sued.  If there are insufficient facts 
for a court to infer a cause of action, the plaintiff must also claim the basis 
for his right to relief.  But this claim should not then be put to an additional 
“plausibility” test.  This middle ground creates an avenue to eliminate 
meritless claims early in the litigation process while still allowing plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                 
234.  For example, in the pleading form for injury from negligent driving, if the plaintiff 
had not identified the negligence of the defendant as his basis for relief, he would have 
needed additional facts allowing the court to infer negligence on the part of the other driver. 
235.  Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 235202 at *16 
(E.D. N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
236.  Id. at *19. 
237.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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an opportunity to prove a claim that, based on the pleading, is legally and 
factually possible.  Oklahoma’s current standard, employing the “no set of 
facts” language, may fulfill such a role if properly applied. While the 
process is arguably less speedy than application of the Iqbal plausibility 
standard, and both the plaintiff and the defendant may incur some expense, 
refraining from a determination of plausibility when considering a motion 
to dismiss will, in the long run, be most just. 
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